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Abstract
The current system for ￿nancing cross-border students, based on the
host country, is neither sustainable nor e¢ cient: it produces too little
cross-border education. On that background, and motivated as well by
a recent decision of the European Court of Justice, we explore two alter-
native solutions. The ￿rst one substitutes to the ￿nancing by the host
country, a ￿nancing by the country of origin, through vouchers that the
student may use at home or abroad provided it is in a recognized insti-
tution. The second one, potentially an e¢ cient design, combines that
substitution with a reimbursement of education costs through interjuris-
dictional transfers or the change of vouchers into contingent loans.
JEL. I22, I23, H77
Keywords: Bologna process, Higher Education, Contingent loan, Bhag-
wati tax.
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11 Introduction
More and more students are crossing national borders to get either credits or
full degrees abroad. This is especially true within the European Union (EU).
Actually two di⁄erent reasons at least motivate those cross border ￿ ows of stu-
dents. On the one hand, students may consider that an international experience
makes them bi- or multi-cultural and provides them with additional capabilities
when entering the labor market: they may play in European Liga, no longer in
the sole domestic one; they belong to an international elite also called a common
pool of talents - the term is used by Haupt, Krieger and Lange (2010) for mobile
students -, and contribute to the creation of a single EU market for high skill
graduates.1 The EU national and supra-national authorities themselves seem to
be convinced that such a creation is desirable. They have launched the Erasmus
program which ￿nances studies abroad on an exchange basis. They also sup-
port the Bologna process which, by creating well de￿ned transferable credits,
makes diplomas more transparent and comparable; and insisting on the quality
of Higher Education, that process favors international mobility of students.
On the other hand, students try to get a degree abroad because they fail
at entrance examination in Higher Education (HE) institutions in their coun-
try of origin. Then they move to a neighboring country where HE is of good
quality, cheap and provided in their mother tongue. The Bologna process and
the free circulation of workers within the EU make such behavior easier today
than previously. This is typically the case in medical and paramedical ￿elds
of study, or still in veterinary medicine, where a huge number of French and
German students, failing at entrance test in their origin country, ￿nd a sub-
stitute in the French speaking part of Belgium or in Austria and return home
after obtaining their degree; in that sense France and Germany free-ride their
neighbor. According to OECD (2010), there are 16,650 French students in ter-
tiary education in Belgium against 2,768 Belgian students in France; similatly
there are 17,464 German students in Austrian tertiary education against 6,419
Austrian in Germany (see also Table 1 infra).
Those in- and out-￿ ows of students do not raise speci￿c issues for public
￿nance as long as they are balanced. This was the reasoning at the root of the
Erasmus program: a student of a given university in a given country spends a
term or a full academic year in a university of another country and a student of
that latter university goes to the former. Consequently, students are exchanged,
not money: each student enrolls in the university of the country where she comes
from. However that system becomes problematic when some destinations are
more valued than other countries, for various reasons like teaching language or
quality of life.
1Few empirical works however investigate the wage e⁄ect of mobility; that e⁄ect may di⁄er
quite importantly from +20 to -5 pro cent according to Ball and Chik (2001), Bracht et al.
(2006), Palifka (2003). The link between students and graduates mobility is documented by
Parey and Waldinger (2008). Mechtenberg and Strausz, although they are among the ￿rst
(2008) to set forth the advantage of being bi-cultural, quali￿es that advantage in their (2009,
2010) papers.
2However this paper does not focus on those exchange students, so called
Erasmus students. It rather focuses on those who enroll in a HE institution
abroad in order to get credits2 that they will impute on the amount of credits
needed to get a degree in their country of origin; or in order to get a full degree
that they will use on the labor market either at home or abroad. Those students
are called Bologna students in this paper; they may have decided to study abroad
to become multicultural or because there was no room for them in domestic HE
institutions. In any case not only students circulate across borders, but also
(claims for) money.
That latter circulation deserves explanation. In most EU countries ￿UK is a
noticeable exception ￿two features characterize the ￿nancing of HE, very small,
or even zero, tuition fee on the one hand, quasi fully public funding by domestic
authorities on the other hand.3 Moreover EU rules prohibit discrimination
between domestic and other EU residents. As a consequence a student of a
given country A who gets her degree in country B and then never works in, and
never pays tax to, that country, generates an externality: country B provides
country A (supposed to be the country where career is spent) with enriched
human capital for free. Thus there is a transfer from B to A and potentially
a claim for money from country B. In US public universities where state and
non-state residents are classmates, that problem has been solved through a
di⁄erentiated tuition fee at least for the ￿rst year of studies. In UK, where that
externality is large ￿see Table 1 ￿it has been internalized through a high tuition
fee charged identically to both UK and non-UK but EU residents. In Belgium
and similarly in Austria, where that externality is still larger than in UK ￿see
again Table 1 ￿the problem has been solved through imposing a quota of no
more than 30 per cent of EU non-Belgium residents in sensitive ￿elds of studies.
That quota however has been considered by the European Court of Justice,
the ultimate custodian of EU principles, as not compatible with EU Law. For
the Court indeed ￿Articles 18 and 21 TFEU (the Treaty founding the EU) pre-
clude national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which
limits the number of students not regarded as resident in Belgium who may
enroll for the ￿rst time in medical and paramedical courses at Higher Educa-
tion establishments, unless the referring court, having assessed all the relevant
evidence submitted by the competent authorities, ￿nds that that legislation is
justi￿ed in the light of the objective of protection of public health.￿ Moreover,
although ￿the Belgian Government, supported by the Austrian Government,
con￿rms that the legislation at issue in the main proceedings is necessary to
attain the objective of ensuring the quality and continuing provision of med-
ical and paramedical care within the French Community￿ , the Court adds that
￿it follows from the case-law that a di⁄erence in treatment based indirectly on
nationality may be justi￿ed by the objective of maintaining a balanced high-
quality medical service open to all, in so far as it contributes to achieving a high
level of protection of health. Thus, it must be determined whether the legisla-
2Known as ECTS, an acronym for European Credit Transfer System.
3See Aghion et al. (2008, 2010), Justmann and Thisse (1997, 2000), Andersson and Konrad
(2003), Barr (1998), Poutvaara and Kanniainen (2000).
3tion at issue in the main proceedings is appropriate for securing the attainment
of that legitimate objective and whether it goes beyond what is necessary to at-
tain it (...) That being the case, it is for the competent national authorities to
show that such risks actually exist. According to settled case-law, it is for those
authorities, where they adopt a measure derogating from a principle enshrined
by European Union Law, to show in each individual case that that measure is
appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective relied upon and does
not go beyond what is necessary to attain it. The reasons invoked by a Member
State by way of justi￿cation must thus be accompanied by an analysis of the
appropriateness and proportionality of the measure adopted by that State and
by speci￿c evidence substantiating its arguments￿ .4
That decision of the ECJ provides us with an additional and increased mo-
tivation for this paper. It aims not only at putting forward the ine¢ ciency of
the current principle of ￿nancing HE students mobility but also at investigating
alternatives to quotas which may be more ￿appropriate for securing the attain-
ment of the objective relied upon and does not go beyond what is necessary to
attain it￿ .
Table 1 ￿Pro￿le of students￿mobility in various EU Member States5
Country Foreign students (%) Balance of mobility (%)
Belgium 6.46 -4.69
Austria 8.07 -4.42




Check Republic 2.66 -1.09












Source : GØrard et Vandenberghe (2007), based on
Oecd and Unesco ￿gures from 2006 or 2007.
4See European Court of Justice (2010).
5The second column of the Table shows the percentage of foreign students from EU Member
states in the total number of students in local institutions of Higher Education; the third
column gives the ratio between the di⁄erence between the number of outgoing local students
4Thereafter, section 2 presents and discusses the model used to conduct the
analysis; it also shows the benchmark e¢ cient equilibrium it may generate. Then
section 3 set forth the ine¢ ciency of the current system of ￿nancing HE mobile
students, called the Host Country Principle. Section 4 suggests using another
principle, called the Origin Country Principle, to design a system operating
through two vouchers, and discusses under which circumstances such device is
more e¢ cient. Then, at section 5, we expand the model in order to take into
account the possibility for the graduate from a country to spend her career in a
country which is neither her country of origin nor her country of HE; contingent
loans and the use of a Bhagwati tax6 are then investigated. Some remarks and
avenues for further studies are issued at section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Interested reader will usefully read Mechtenberg and Strausz (2008, 2009,
2010) and their references. For those authors ￿the most stable result established
by this kind of literature is that although increasing mobility [...] will lead to
higher private investment in education, public provision will decrease. The
government will tend to free ride on the education system of other country￿ .
Buettner and Schwager (2004) obtains similar results while, next to the free rider
e⁄ect, Kemnitz (2005) sets forth competition between governments to provide
education to mobile students.
2 The Model
Let us assume a simple world, say a rudimentary European Union, consisting of
two local jurisdictions or Member States denoted by i and j respectively. Each
of them wants to maximize the social welfare of its own residents. Therefore
it decides on the degree of international openness of its future workers; that
degree is measured by the number of credits, or European Credits Transfer
System (ECTS), that it commits to provide to incoming foreign students or to
outgoing residents depending on the institutional environment at work.
The tuition fee requested from students is zero and then the cost of providing
Higher Education is totally supported by the jurisdiction budget, what is close to
the actual funding system in the EU. Also there is no di⁄erence between the costs
of providing Higher Education to foreign and domestic students; indeed, such
di⁄erence, if any, is small as reported by Throsby (1999). For the jurisdiction
whose the students are residents, the cost of studies also include the opportunity
costs of studying, i.e. the cost of not participating to the labor market during
the studies. The cost of studies, fully socialized and supported by the local
budget, might include a student￿ s salary and it is eventually ￿nanced by taxes;
however graduates will pay taxes in the country where they will work, not in
that they are coming from.
￿to EU countries ￿and that of incoming students ￿from EU countries ￿on the one hand,
and the total number of Higher Education students in the country on the other hand.
6That tax has been suggested by economist Bhagwati in order to o⁄set developing countries
whose students, after completing their education in developed countries, decided to stay and
work there rather than to return home; see Bhagwati (1976) and Wilson (2008).
5The objective function of the government of country i might be written as
an intertemporal Social Welfare Function
Wi = f (eii;r￿eij + (1 ￿ r)￿eji) ￿ c(eii + eji) ￿ w(eii + eij) (1)
In that equation, f(x;z) is the local production function of wealth; it is char-
acterized by a technology using locally and internationally educated graduates.
The former have been educated only at home, in the domestic establishments
of Higher Education. The latter have been educated abroad: either they are
natives of the country who come back home after the completion of their studies
abroad - what they do with a probability r - or they are foreigners who come to
the country for getting credits or a degree and who then decide to remain in the
country after their studies - what they do with probability 1￿r. Both groups of
internationally educated graduates are said to be bi-cultural and have an extra,
identical or smaller ability to contribute to wealth production characterized by
￿ ? 1.7 Moreover, e represents the number of ECTS: among the two subscripts
associated to that variable, the ￿rst one denotes the country of origin of the
student, and the second one indicates the country where she studies; c(x) is the
cost of producing ECTS and w stands for the opportunity cost of dedicating
time to getting an ECTS rather than contributing to current production of lo-
cal wealth. The equation shows that a country bene￿ts from ECTS obtained
abroad by its own residents who return home after their studies.
The ￿rst order condition of the maximization of the objective function with
respect to the decision variables under control of the local government, eii and
either eji or eij allows us to derive the optimal behavior of the government. Es-
pecially it enables to write the reaction function of government i to government
j decisions regarding the number of foreign students (or ECTS) that it decides
to host or the number of resident students that it wants to send abroad. Nash
equilibrium might then be computed.
Under the Host Country Principle equilibrium gives the number of ECTS
that each jurisdiction will provide to foreign students; those numbers may be
regarded as the quotas applied by Austria and Belgium. In contrast, under the
Origin Country Principle, those numbers refer to the students sent abroad by
the jurisdiction at its own expenses. In both cases however those numbers are
ine¢ cient. In the former case indeed the government of i deciding in its own
best interest will base its decision on the sole fraction 1 ￿ r of hosted foreign
students who will stay in the country after their studies and contribute to the
production of local wealth; the fraction r of those students returning home
after completing their studies will be disregarded. On the contrary, in the latter
case, only students returning home after their studies matter for the government
which ￿nances them, those remaining in the host country being disregarded.
The lack of e¢ ciency of those situations has to be appreciated with respect
to an e¢ cient benchmark provided by the joint maximization of Wi +Wj w.r.t.
eii, ejj, eij and eji. Assuming the right concavity of the production function,
7See above the two reasons why basically students are going abroad for studies; see also
Mechtenberg and Strausz (2008, 2009, 2010).
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where a subscript d refers to purely domestic students and a subscript m to










where a superscript E refers to e¢ ciency.8 We observe that neither r nor 1 ￿ r
appear in that equation.
In section 5 we will try to ￿nd out institutional arrangements which replicate
those values without implying a centralized process.
That model however deserves at least two comments. On the one hand
it considers only the supply of ECTS by the HE authorities of each country;
students￿wishes do not play any role unlike in many papers. The justi￿cation
we give is that demand for ECTS is constrained by supply in a world where
the price is zero.9 On the other hand, HE institutions and governments are not
distinguished from one another. That may correspond to a world where HE is
publicly funded and provided. However even in such a world, HE establishments
may have a behavior which does not ￿t exactly the wishes of public authorities
whose they are the agents; it will be however up to a further development of
this research to cope with that issue.
3 The Host Country Principle
As documented in the introductory section, in most EU Member States ECTS
provided to foreign students are ￿nanced by the host country which thus imports
post secondary students and some months or years later exports an enriched
human capital which will contribute to the wealth and revenue of its country of
enrichment in proportion 1 ￿ r only. In that setting it is up to that country to
decide on the number of foreign students it will host and thus on the maximal
number of credits it will provide to foreign students. That number might be
regarded as a quota.




ii ￿ wii = 0
(1 ￿ r)￿fi
ji ￿ c0
ji = 0 (4)
8To easily understand the derivation of ed and em assume that the production technology
is speci￿ed by f(x;z) = ￿lnx + ￿￿ lnz where x = eii or ejj and z = reij + (1 ￿ r)eji or
reji + (1 ￿ r)eij.
9See GØrard (2007).
7and similarly for the other jurisdiction. Under the same assumptions as in the











m is the outcome at Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative simulta-
neous game between the two governments.
Comparing the second line of equation (5) with that of equation (3) we
denote two main di⁄erences, the presence of 1 ￿ r and the absence of w in the
denominator. The former illustrates that only students expected to remain in
the country have been taken into account, the latter that the host country does
not support the lack of production su⁄ered by the country of origin of those












and might be either positive or negative, will involve an underprovision of
mobile students if




In the opposite case an overprovision occurs. For illustrative purpose, one may
suppose an opportunity cost of 12,000 Euros a year and a cost of studies of 7,000
Euros as it is the case in paramedical studies (GØrard and Vandenberghe, 2007),
then the threshold value for r amounts to .63 which is certainly compatible with
today European situation so that we can suggest that the quotas implied by the
current system of ￿nancing mobile HE produce too few cross border Higher













so that foreign students are more likely to be welcome when their probability
to return home after their studies goes down, when the cost of those studies
for the host country is smaller and when their potential contribution to the
production of wealth is larger. In other terms best welcome are those with a
high probability to stay and a high return on investment ￿=c.
4 The Origin Country Principle
According to that principle, it is up to the country of origin of the student,
understood as that where she completed her previous studies ￿like that where
she got her high school degree ￿ , to fund her HE regardless the country where
those studies are performed, but provided it is in a school whose good quality
8has been certi￿ed and recognized by the paying authority. That system is quite
similar to that used for health care. For Higher Education, it is used by Swiss
cantons (GØrard, 2008b) and most often in the case of students sent abroad with
a fellowship from her origin country.
Let us ￿rst set forth the main lessons which arise from the use of that
principle; then we will discuss its properties and its feasibility.
4.1 The Principle
So far the government of country i decided on the number of ECTS eji that it
provided to foreign students and maximized equation (1) with respect to that
variable. Now it determines the number of ECTS eij that it allocates to students
from its own jurisdiction that it sends abroad and whose it will ￿nance the cost
of studies. Therefore it now maximizes equation (1) with respect to that latter










and again an externality arises
EO = eE
m ￿ eO




Those results are driven by the fact that the origin country only takes into
account the fraction r of students who will come back after their studies abroad;
the externality, which is positive anyway now, is the "gift" made by the origin
country to the host country and consists in a fraction 1 ￿ r of the students
whose it ￿nances the studies but who will remain in the host country and be
productive in that latter jurisdiction.
Although it is still ine¢ cient, moving from the Host Country Principle to










Using the same ￿gures for c and w as in the previous section we get rHO = :73.
Since actually the probability of returning home is high and might be supposed
larger than that threshold, we may conclude that moving from the Home to the
Origin Country Principle is welfare enhancing.
4.2 Properties and Feasibility
Equation (10) shows that, under the realistic condition (11), moving from the
Host Country Principle to the Origin Country Principle makes us closer to the
9e¢ cient solution. Beyond that economic property, funding of students by the
origin country allows the authorities of that country to expand the geographical
area in which its policy is applied. However that system needs some coopera-
tion between partner countries: that cooperation may take the form of bilateral
treaties or be organized through a EU directive. In that latter case the mech-
anism set forth should be consistent with the subsidiarity principle. According
to that principle and the subsidiarity test suggested by Pelkmans (2005) and
expanded by Ederveen, Gelau⁄ and Pelkmans (2008), you start with all the
competencies exerted at the lower level, say the Member States - which is the
case according to the currently applied Host Country Principle. Then, you test
for the presence of externalities and compare the gain from reducing those exter-
nalities (moving from Host to Origin given a high value of r) with the cost from
departing from local social preferences (here we assume preference homogeneity
between jurisdictions). If the outcome of that bene￿t - cost analysis is positive,
you have arguments to act in common on the competency at stake. Acting in
common may however take various forms. The most consistent with subsidiarity
is to have an intergovernmental agreement - say a network of bilateral treaties
or a multilateral arrangement. Only if that device is not credible, set up an
institution like a special agency or a directorate-general of the EU Commission
in charge of that competency. In that latter case however that agency may
still simply issue rules e.g. through a EU directive - again the most consistent
organization from the point of view of subsidiarity -, or it may take care for the
regulation and the ￿nancing of the competency, or it may also levy the money
needed for exerting that competency, through a tax levied at that upper level.
We have that in mind when suggesting the following device for the ￿nancing
mechanism based on the Origin Country Principle,
- The origin country ￿rst decides on the total number of students who are
permitted to follow a given ￿eld of studies and who are ￿nanced therefore wher-
ever they attend courses ￿at home or abroad ￿but provided it is in an agreed
institution.
- To those students, the origin country gives a voucher dedicated to cover
the corresponding tuition fee, and possibly another voucher to ￿nance the cost
of living during the studies and to stimulate Higher Education attendance by
socially targeted groups or in targeted ￿elds of studies and careers.
- In line with bi- or multilateral arrangements like bilateral treaties or EU
directives, HE institutions at home or abroad only enroll students able to show
up a voucher.
That institutional device thus locates either at the level of a credible inter-
governmental arrangement or at that of an agency issuing rules; we can term
it a coordinated decentralized device. It turns out that the Higher Education
policy of the origin country ￿e.g. regarding enrolment in veterinary medicine
￿is no longer applied by the sole domestic schools of that jurisdiction but by
the partner countries￿HE institutions as well. That feature might be regarded
as an improvement with respect to the current situation where a student who
fails admission tests in a given ￿eld in her country of origin migrates to the
country next door for the purpose of studying that ￿eld, and returns home af-
10ter completing her education, with a degree fully recognized by her country of
origin.
Two remarks still deserve consideration at this moment. First, the cost of
studies is assumed to be identical across countries for any given ￿eld. That
makes the valuation of the voucher easier; beyond that, it implies that the
partner countries are able to jointly determine the cost of getting a set of ECTS
or a degree in a given ￿eld of studies. GØrard and Vandenberghe (2007) provides
￿gures based on public funds allocated to the French speaking Belgian Higher
Education institutions for the academic year 2005-2006: around 7,000 Euros per
student per year in paramedical non-university Higher Education institutions
like schools for nurses; 11,000 or 17,000 Euros per student per year in medicine
and veterinary medicine (the former for the ￿rst two years and the latter for
the subsequent years).
Second, the requirement that vouchers be solely used in institutions agreed
by the issuing country relates the mechanism described above to the criterion
of quality at work in the Bologna process. Actually that requirement might be
satis￿ed either through a process of mutual recognition ￿each Member State
recognizes as an institution of good quality a school regarded as such by the
authorities of the jurisdiction where it is located ￿or through a label granted
by certifying agencies ￿e.g. the Equis label for management schools.
Finally, notice that a centralized solution, according to which an agency op-
erated at upper level of government, is in charge of deciding, for each lower level
jurisdiction, on the number of students who will study at home and the num-
ber of students who will study abroad, might replicate the e¢ ciency outcome
described in section 2. That solution however is not very consistent with the
subsidiarity principle. That is however not a reason to disregard it. In some
federal countries, although HE is a state, regional or provincial competence, like
Canada, federal fellowships exist.
In the section below we show that e¢ ciency might be reached through the
application of a decentralized device. And we show that in a more general
framework.
5 Bhagwati tax and contingent loan or e¢ ciency
restored
So far we have considered the sole mobility of students and assumed that, when
mobile across borders, after completing their studies abroad, they either return
home - with probability r - and spend their entire career in their home country,
or they remain abroad - with probability 1￿ r - and decide for a career in that
latter jurisdiction. Now suppose that after graduating abroad, those individuals
belong to a pool of internationally mobile talented workers. For the ease of the
exposition we continue to assume two countries. Suppose ￿rst that the Origin
Country Principle is still at work but see 1 ￿ r as the fraction of the career
span spent abroad, actually in this model in the foreign country of HE. Then
11revise the model and reintroduce the Host Country Principle interpreting r as
the fraction of the career span spent at home. In both cases, during the fraction
of time spent in a country other than the one which has ￿nanced the studies,
the graduate has to compensate that latter country for the investment in her
education which she does not repay through local tax payments.
That compensation may take two forms. First it may take the form of a
Bhagwati tax. For the years she does not pay regular tax to the jurisdiction
which invested in her HE, the graduate will pay a special tax to that jurisdiction,
which is a form of Bhagwati tax. That tax might be paid toward the tax
system of the country where she works and an international clearing system;
that devices may require a minimum of international coordination but it is
feasible in the context of the EU, a priori no more no less than the Origin
Country Principle of the previous section. If necessary, when the coordinated
system may not work, one can imagine international assistance in debt payments
being operated or even - if the Origin Country applies - that relatives are made
responsible for those tax payments in case of the default of the debtor, as it
may be the case for contingent loans.
Alternatively the grant associated to the ￿nancing of studies, possibly in-
cluding a student￿ s salary, might be turned into a contingent loan pro rata the
years spent outside the country which has ￿nanced the studies. The ￿nancing
country may get its money back through the tax system of the country where
the graduate works and the operation of a clearing system. Contingent loans
mechanism is such operated domestically in e.g. Australia.
Let us denote by ￿ the payment due by the graduate not working in the
country which has ￿nanced her studies - actually that payment is either (1 ￿ r)￿
or r￿. Under the Origin Country Principle, ￿ is such that equation (1) is now
rewritten
Wi = f (eii;r￿eij + (1 ￿ r)￿eji) ￿ c(eii + eij) ￿ w(eii + eij)
+(1 ￿ r)￿eij ￿ (1 ￿ r)￿eji (12)








c + w ￿ (1 ￿ r)￿
(13)
Comparing the second line of equation (13) with that of equation (3) we can
compute the value ￿
O of ￿ which replicates the e¢ ciency outcome. Then
￿
O = c + w (14)
That the Bhagwati tax is equal to the sum of the marginal cost of studies and the
opportunity cost of those studies is obviously not a surprise. Then eBO
m = eE
m.
In other terms the revenue of imposing a Bhagwati tax or of turning the grant
into a pro rata temporis contingent loan is
(1 ￿ r)￿
O = (1 ￿ r)(c + w) (15)
12Under the Host Principle Country, the corresponding payment comes from
the maximization of
Wi = f (eii;r￿eij + (1 ￿ r)￿eji) ￿ c(eii + eji) ￿ w(eii + eij)
+￿reji ￿ ￿r￿eij (16)








c + w ￿ r￿
(17)
and e¢ ciency is restored if
￿




so that the revenue for the studies ￿nancing host country actually is
r￿
H = rc ￿ (1 ￿ r)w (19)
Here the optimal Bhagwati tax corresponds to an optimal di⁄erentiated tuition
fee covering the cost of studies minus a term related to the probability of re-
maining in the host country. Especially the tax decreases with that probability.
6 Remarks and avenues for further research
Let us issue three remarks which are as many avenues for further research.
In this paper, unlike in - but as a consequence of - GØrard (2007) we have
disregarded student￿ s decision assuming that demand for ECTS is constrained
by supply due to a zero tuition fee. In the framework of the present paper we may
imagine that in the case where, say, the Origin Country Principle applies, the
government decides that the best students deserve HE abroad and that another
number of students, comprised between the lower threshold of capability to be
sent abroad and a further lower threshold are con￿ned to HE at home; this is
typically consistent with ￿ > 1. Or we can consider that the government decides
of educating at home the best students and to provide them with country speci￿c
capabilities, including a useful social network, while second class students have
to be educated abroad; this is consistent with ￿ < 1. In both cases there is room
for introducing di⁄erences in the capacity of the students to access HE. Similar
discussion might be related to the Host Country Principle. Then HE institutions
of the host country, supported by their own government, either compete with
those of the origin country to get the most talented students - a competition
in quality if not in price -, or they accept those who have failed at entrance
examination in their origin country, maybe because accumulation of students
means accumulation of budget. In any case there is room for (re)introducing in
13the model such items as the behavior of students and the respective quality of
HE institutions.
Not unrelated to that ￿rst remark, especially to its penultimate sentence, is
the relation between HE institutions and governments. In the paper we have
supposed that the objectives of the governments and those of the schools are
identical. That may not be the case. If the HE institutions are autonomous
enough they may pursue objectives di⁄erent from those of their government.
Though that latter may be social welfare maximizing, schools may intend to
have as many students as possible in order to have a larger share of the HE
budget and so to be in better capacity to conduct research programs and to
become more prestigious. The relation between governments and HE institu-
tions should be usefully further developed and captured in a Principal-Agent
model.10 That raises several related questions as to the incentive to institutions
and their governance.
Finally, the model used in that paper assumes symmetric jurisdictions. How-
ever, as mentioned in the introduction, one of the real issues at the origin of this
paper is the free riding of two small countries by their respective large neigh-
bor. More generally there is room for introducing asymmetry in the model.
Two typical asymmetries are in terms of size and in terms of social preferences.
Indeed the move from the Host to the Origin Country Principle, either or not
completed by a Bhagwati tax or contingent loan, even if it increases aggregate
social welfare, it may not increase large country welfare. Further, if the reform
has a negative e⁄ect on the welfare of the large country it may have a negative
aggregate welfare e⁄ect although the small country actually gains. That raises
the issue of the feasibility and credibility of a bilateral agreement, and of the
decision making process in a larger Union like the EU. Asymmetry in social
preferences may also impact the solutions discussed here especially the need for
coordination.
7 Conclusion
Today funding of cross border Higher Education students based on the Host
Country Principle is neither sustainable nor e¢ cient. Against that background
the paper has investigated two alternative solutions both compatible with the
principles of functioning of the European Union.
The ￿rst solution substitutes to the ￿nancing by the host country a funding
by the country of origin of the student. Based on vouchers permitted to be used
either domestically or abroad provided it is in Higher Education institutions
whose quality has been recognized by the issuing country, that system is more
e¢ cient than the current one if the probability to return home after the com-
pletion of the studies is higher than a given threshold. That mechanism obeys
the following characteristics,
10The issue mentioned in that paragraph seems to be especially relevant in a country like
Belgium where institutions have to share a given budget coming from the public authorities.
14- The origin country ￿rst decides on the total number of students who are
permitted to follow a given ￿eld of studies and who are ￿nanced therefore wher-
ever they attend courses ￿at home or abroad ￿but provided it is in an agreed
institution.
- To those students, the origin country gives a voucher dedicated to cover
the corresponding tuition fee, and possibly another voucher to ￿nance the cost
of living during the studies and to stimulate Higher Education attendance by
socially targeted groups or in targeted ￿elds of studies and careers.
- In line with bi- or multilateral arrangements like bilateral treaties or EU
directives, Higher Education institutions at home or abroad only enroll students
able to show up a voucher.
The second solution introduces the refund by the graduate of the investment
in Higher Education made by either the origin or the host country pro rata the
years of her career spent outside the country which has ￿nanced her studies.
That refund might take the form of a transfer payment between countries ￿a
Bhagwati tax. It may also take the form of turning vouchers into contingent
loans the charge of them being due for the sole years of the career spent outside
the paying country. That second solution might be designed in such a way that
it makes it an e¢ cient device: the amount of cross border education generated
by that process is then identical to that produced by a centralized mechanism
aiming at maximizing aggregate social welfare.
At the end of the paper remarks are formulated which are as many avenues
for further research; they refer to the behavior of students and the quality of
institutions, to the Principal-Agent relation which may exist between the govern-
ment and the Higher Education institutions, and to possible interjurisdictional
asymmetries in size and social preferences. A ￿nal remark usefully takes place
at this moment: the alternative solutions presented and discussed in this paper
only apply to students coming from developed countries.
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